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Toward Aligning the Law with Biology? The
Federal Circuit’s About Face in Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.*
John C. Stolpa

**

INTRODUCTION
Advances in biotechnology offer great potential for the
health and welfare of humankind. As our knowledge of
microscopic cellular processes and their relationship to the
functioning of the body as a whole grows, so does the potential
to develop new cures for a broad range of diseases. Realization
of this potential depends upon many factors, including how the
courts apply existing patent doctrines to biological inventions.
Scientists need to protect their discoveries adequately in order
to encourage research and development, while businesses need
a reliable intellectual property portfolio to attract investors.
Both needs can be fulfilled by a patent system that is
predictable and addresses the unique issues raised by
biotechnology.
This fulfillment may necessitate a
Congressional amendment of the patent laws for biological
inventions and the promulgation of clear judicial rules in these
matters.
1
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals reached a decision that could signal
that biotechnology presents novel issues for patent laws and
that the current doctrines are inadequate. The case centered
2
on a patent owned by plaintiff Enzo Biochem, Inc. (Enzo)
relating to DNA probes capable of specifically detecting the

* This comment is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
** J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2004.
Ph.D.
Microbiology and Immunology, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center,
2000. B.A. Chemistry, The Colorado College, 1993.
1. 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Because two Federal Circuit cases
share a common name, the initial decision, 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), will
be referred to as Enzo I, while the rehearing, 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
will be denoted Enzo II.
2. See U.S. Patent No. 4,900,659 (issued Feb. 13, 1990).
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bacteria that cause gonorrhea over the highly homologous
3
bacteria responsible for meningitis. The precise sequences of
the probes were not included in the patent specification, but
they were described by their selective binding properties, and
4
samples of the sequences were placed in a public depository.
Enzo brought an action for patent infringement against a group
5
of biotechnology and pharmaceutical interests. The group
subsequently moved for summary judgment that the claims
were invalid for failure to meet the written description
6
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1. The district
7
court granted the motion.
A split Federal Circuit panel
8
initially affirmed the decision (hereinafter Enzo I). However,
just over three months later, the Federal Circuit abruptly
vacated its former holding, reversed and remanded the district
court’s ruling (hereinafter Enzo II), and denied a petition for
9
rehearing en banc.
Two major issues are raised by the case, both relating to
exactly what satisfies the written description requirement for
biotechnology inventions. The first issue is whether functional
terms are sufficient to meet the written description
requirement for biological inventions in general and DNA
10
molecules specifically. This is an important point because the
Federal Circuit had previously established an almost per se
rule that only the exact sequence of a DNA molecule would
11
provide an adequate written description. This exact-sequence
rule is problematic, as it ignores the fact that biological
inventions are not always amenable to purely structural

3. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1320-21.
4. See id. Depositories such as the American Type Culture Collection
(ATCC) maintain and propagate samples of biological materials (including
DNAs, bacteria, and mammalian cells) submitted by scientists. For a small
maintenance fee, members of the scientific community may obtain these
samples for their own research purposes. See generally ATCC website, at
http://www.atcc.org (explaining the depository principle and procedures,
including deposits for patenting purposes) (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
5. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1016.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1013.
9. See id.; see also Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1330.
10. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1328.
11. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating “[a]n adequate written description of a DNA . . .
‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties’”) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
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descriptions and many structurally distinct DNAs are
functionally equivalent. The Federal Circuit’s reversal may
indicate a realization that this per se approach is untenable and
functional aspects of biological inventions may be the means
required to describe them adequately.
The second issue is whether the purpose of the written
description requirement is solely to prove that an inventor
possessed the invention at the time of filing, or if the doctrine
12
This
serves additional purposes for biological inventions.
issue is important because prior case law establishes that proof
of possession of the invention satisfies the written description
13
requirement in the non-biological arts. As such, an actual
deposit of the material would seem to be the ideal way of
establishing possession.
However, significant confusion
surrounds whether a deposit, or the recitation of the DNA
sequence in the specification, or both is required. The Federal
Circuit’s ruling in Enzo II suggests that a deposit, and
14
However, this
therefore possession alone, is sufficient.
conflicts with the Circuit’s earlier holding that the actual
15
Failure to resolve this
sequence must be delineated.
ambiguity will create uncertainty in biotechnology and could
stifle research and development.
This Comment will examine the current status of the
written description requirement and analyze whether the
Federal Circuit sufficiently clarified the issue in its Enzo II
holding. Section I will provide a basic lesson in biotechnology
and will detail the evolution of the written description
requirement as applied to biotechnology inventions. Section II
will describe the court’s two holdings and the rationales behind
them. Finally, Section III will critique these rationales. This
Comment concludes that although the court’s holding is a step
in the right direction, significant confusion still surrounds the
written description requirement. Further, the Federal Circuit
should extend their holding by ruling en banc that the
disclosure requirement may be satisfied by enabling others to

12. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1329-30.
13. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (stating “the Patent Act and this court’s case law require only
sufficient description to show one of skill in the refining art that the inventor
possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing”).
14. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1326.
15. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569 (holding that the description of a cDNA
“requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of
the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA”).
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make and use a DNA invention, rather than requiring the
recitation of the DNA sequence, and that the disclosure
requirement may be demonstrated by both functional and
structural data.
I. BACKGROUND
A. BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
“Biotechnology” is a catchall term, encompassing a vast
array of technologies that continue to grow with each new
discovery. A relatively small number of technological areas
have received most of the judicial focus, largely because issues
related to these methodologies have been adjudicated by the
Federal Circuit or its predecessor Court of Claims and Patent
Appeals (CCPA). The substances that have been addressed
16
significantly by these courts include monoclonal antibodies,
17
18
antisense RNA, and recombinant DNA technology.
For
reasons elaborated below, this Comment will focus on problems
best illustrated by recombinant DNA technology. However, the
arguments made here may be applied to other areas of
biotechnology, or to any rapidly progressing technology.
The genetic information of an organism is stored within
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a complex macromolecule located
19
in the nucleus of each cell. The backbone of a single DNA
strand is made up of a polymer of sugars, with each sugar
20
bound to one nucleotide base. There are four bases in DNA
21
designated A, T, C, and G. These bases are the “letters” of a
molecular alphabet, and their specific arrangement encodes the
data necessary for the functional characteristics of a cell and, in
22
turn, an organism. DNA is maintained as a double helix of
two complementary strands, as each base binds with a

16. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing
monoclonal antibodies used in the diagnosis of Hepatitis B).
17. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (describing the use of antisense RNA to prevent ripening of FLAVR
SAVR tomato).
18. See, e.g., In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing the
method for producing mammalian polypeptides in plant cells).
19. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 335
(Miranda Robertson et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994) (1983).
20. See id. at 98-99.
21. See id. The four bases are: Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Cytosine (C),
and Guanine (G). See id.
22. See id. at 102.

2003]

ABOUT FACE IN ENZO BIOCHEM

343

particular partner base: A always pairs with T and C always
23
pairs with G.
Human genomic DNA is made up of
approximately three billion of these base pairs, most of which
24
have no known function. Specialized areas of the genome, the
so-called genes, contain the information necessary for the
25
production of the true building blocks of the cell-proteins.
To produce these proteins, a process known as
26
transcription first occurs. In this process, DNA is used as a
27
28
template to produce a faithful, though condensed, copy of the
29
gene sequence.
This copied genetic information is then
transported by single stranded molecules of messenger
ribonucleic acid (mRNA) out of the nucleus to the cytoplasm
30
where protein synthesis occurs.
In a process known as translation, each mRNA is used as a
template for the construction of the protein encoded by the
31
original gene sequence within the genomic DNA. The bases of
each mRNA are sequentially “read” in groups of three, with
32
each triplet referred to as a codon. Each codon specifies the
incorporation of a specific amino acid into the nascent protein
33
chain. This process continues until a special codon, known as
a “stop codon,” is reached, terminating the building process and
34
releasing the completed protein.
A degree of redundancy exists in the transfer of
information from DNA to protein, leading to what is termed the

23. See id. at 99.
24. See id. at 339-40.
25. See id. at 104.
26. See id. at 104-05.
27. Slight modifications are made to the mRNA molecule. The DNA base
thymine (T) is substituted in each instance with the base uracil (U). See id. at
100. In addition, a methylated cap structure is placed at the beginning (or 5’
end) and a series of adenine bases are added at the terminus (or 3’ end) of the
mRNA molecule. See id. at 368-69. Despite these alterations, the essential
coding sequence of the original DNA molecule is maintained. See id.
28. Genes are composed of both protein-coding sequences known as exons
interspersed with noncoding, regulatory regions know as introns. See id. at
105. As mRNAs are processed, intron sequences are excised and exon
sequences rejoined to one another by a catalytic process known as “splicing.”
See id. The resulting mRNA thus contains only the contiguous protein-coding
regions and is thus shorter than the corresponding genomic DNA. See id.
29. See id. at 104-05.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 106-07.
32. See id. at 106.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 234.
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“degeneracy” of the genetic code. Although the four bases that
comprise DNA can be arranged into sixty-four different
36
codons, there are only 20 amino acids employed in the
37
manufacture of human proteins. Therefore, most of the amino
38
acids are encoded by multiple unique codons. As a result, a
scientist in possession of the nucleotide sequence of a particular
gene can readily determine the corresponding protein
39
sequence. Possession of a protein sequence, however, does not
allow a researcher to define the exact gene sequence that
40
encodes that protein.
B. RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY
Recombinant DNA techniques provide a convenient means
41
to produce large amounts of a particular protein.
This
technique is important both for researching the function of a
given protein and in the industrial production of the protein for
42
therapeutic use in plants, humans, and animals.
mRNA molecules expressed by a cell can be isolated and
converted into a DNA copy by using a viral enzyme in a process
43
called reverse transcription. The resulting DNA molecules
contain only the protein-coding sequences of genes, and are
44
referred to as complementary DNAs (cDNAs). Once the cDNA
for a gene is isolated, it may be connected with additional
45
pieces of DNA that promote its transcription. The resulting
construct is a compact DNA molecule free from the regulatory
DNA elements that normally control the rate of its
46
This molecule may then be inserted into
transcription.
various cell types, ranging from bacteria to cultured

35. See id. at 230-31.
36. Three of which are “stop codons.” Id. at 234.
37. See id. at 46.
38. See id. at 230-31. Of the twenty amino acids, only two, methionine
and tryptophan, are encoded solely by a single codon. Id. at 231.
39. See id. at 106.
40. See id. at 314.
41. See generally id. at 291-334 (explaining how recombinant DNA
technology has generated new experimental approaches that have
revolutionized cell biology).
42. See id. at 291.
43. See id. at 310.
44. See id. at 310-11.
45. See id. at 320-21.
46. Id.
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47

mammalian cell lines. These cells are then harnessed as tiny
factories: large volumes of the cells are grown and the protein
is isolated from the milieu by conventional purification
48
techniques. The isolated proteins have myriad uses, including
49
the treatment of human diseases.
Isolated DNA molecules may also be used as probes to
detect the presence of a specific DNA sequence within a larger
50
DNA molecule, such as a bacterial genome. In this process,
the double stranded genomic DNA is first separated into single
strands by heating, then allowed to cool in the presence of the
51
The probe will preferentially
single stranded probe DNA.
anneal to its complementary sequence if it is present in the
52
genomic DNA sample. If the probe is derived from a sequence
unique to the genome of a particular bacterial strain, it may be
used to identify the presence of that strain over a similar
53
bacterium.
The explosion of genomic and proteomic research has
provided a wealth of sequence data for researchers to
54
decipher. With the Human Genome Project fundamentally
completed, it is now possible to scan the entire human genome
55
for potential gene-encoding sequences. The protein sequences
encoded by these genes will soon be determined and added to
the growing list of proteins whose structures are known, but
56
whose functions are not. Researchers will then face the task
57
of discovering functions for these “orphan” protein sequences.
A moderately skilled researcher can employ modern DNA
techniques to readily alter the sequences of isolated cDNAs
58
molecules. This fact, combined with the inherent degeneracy
of the genetic code, allows the rapid creation of many unique

Id. at 321.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 300.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Stanley Fields, Proteomics: Proteomics in Genomeland, 291
SCIENCE 1221, 1221 (2001). Proteomics refers to the study and manipulation
of the set of proteins expressed within a particular cell type. See id.
55. See J.C. Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291
SCIENCE 1304, 1306 (2001).
56. See Fields, supra note 54, at 1221.
57. See id.
58. See ALBERTS, supra note 19, at 323.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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cDNAs that encode the same protein sequence. Thousands of
DNA molecules with unique chemical structures exist that,
when transcribed and translated, all produce exactly the same
60
protein.
C. THE PATENT SYSTEM
The importance of patents to the development of an
industrialized society has been understood in the United States
since its very inception. This realization is manifest in the
Constitutional mandate authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
61
The first Congress
respective Writings and Discoveries.”
exercised this power immediately by adopting the Patent Act of
62
1790.
Though the patent laws are frequently amended, the goals
63
behind them have changed little since 1790. The laws grant a
time-limited monopoly to an inventor as a reward for the
64
discovery and its disclosure to the public. The Supreme Court
recently described the patent system as “a carefully crafted
bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
65
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology.” Thus,
the patent system seeks to promote public access to
technological advances and to reward the inventors who
66
discover them.
In general, an invention is patentable if it is useful, novel

59. See id. at 323-34.
60. See id. at 106 (showing potential combinations of nucleotides encoding
each amino acid).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-12 (1790). See generally
Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 269 (1995).
63. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (3d ed. 2002) (noting “the 1952 Patent Act, the first
major revision of the patent statute since the nineteenth century, restated
many of the fundamental principles on which American patent law had been
based since 1790”).
64. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest
as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 398
(2002).
65. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (citing Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
66. See Saunders, supra note 64, at 398.
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67

and nonobvious.
In addition, the invention must be
adequately disclosed in an application filed with and examined
68
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
The specification of the patent application must sufficiently set
out the details of the invention such that the public may take
69
advantage of its merits after the patent term expires.
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH
The text of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 sets forth
the substantive disclosure requirements that must be met for
70
the issuance of a patent. In essence, this section delineates
what information about the invention must be included in the
71
specification to entitle the inventor to the patent. It provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
72
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

The written description and enablement requirements of §
73
112, paragraph 1 are quite intertwined. Disclosures sufficient
to meet one requirement often provide enough to satisfy the
other. Despite this, the Federal Circuit has held that written
description and enablement are two separate requirements,
and failure to satisfy either can result in the invalidation of a
74
patent.
E. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
The origin of the written description requirement can be
traced back to the original Patent Act of 1793 when an

67. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2002).
68. See id. §§ 111-112.
69. See id. § 112.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (stating in reference to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1: “[t]he purpose
of the description requirement of this paragraph is to state what is needed to
fulfill the enablement criteria. These requirements may be viewed separately,
but they are intertwined.”)
74. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that for a disclosure to be adequate under 35 U.S.C. § 112, it must
have “a ‘written description of the invention’ which is separate and distinct
from the enablement requirement.”).
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adequate description of an invention was all that provided the
75
public with notice of an invention’s scope.
In 1822, the
Supreme Court succinctly stated that, in addition to
enablement, the object of the disclosure was to “put the public
in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so
as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common
76
use. . . .” This notice function, however, was soon obviated
when a requirement for claims was added to the Patent Act in
77
1870. For the next century, a disclosure was adequate if it
78
enabled one of skill to make and use the invention.
The long-dormant written description requirement was
79
given new life in 1967 when the CCPA decided In re Ruschig.
In Ruschig, a claim was added to a patent application one year
80
The court held that the specification
after its filing.
sufficiently enabled one skilled in the art to practice the
81
invention contained in the late claim. Despite this, the court
invalidated the late claim, ruling that an adequate written
description is required to prove that the applicant actually
82
possessed the invention as of the filing date. Thus, a new
purpose for the written description requirement was born: a
means to reject claims added after filing that are not supported
by the disclosure contained within the originally filed
specification. Since 1967, the written description requirement
has served as the statutory basis for establishing the priority
83
dates to which individual claims are entitled.
While both cases were decided on other grounds, the
Federal Circuit reached two decisions establishing key patent
principles for biological inventions that would have serious
84
ramifications for the written description requirement. The
first decision considered genus claims to a series of

75. See id. at 1560-61.
76. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822).
77. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 615, 620 (1998).
78. See id. at 620-21.
79. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
80. See id. at 991.
81. Id. at 996.
82. See id. at 995-96.
83. See Mueller, supra note 77, at 620-21.
84. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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85

recombinant DNAs. Researchers at Amgen had cloned the
human gene for erythropoietin (EPO), a protein useful for
treating anemia by stimulating red blood cell production in the
86
bone marrow. The patent at issue in the case claimed all
DNAs capable of encoding a protein with an amino acid
sequence similar to EPO such that the protein produced from
87
the DNA possessed EPO-like activity. The court invalidated
88
this claim for lack of enablement because it potentially
covered millions of EPO analogs while disclosing the properties
89
of only a few.
The second decision, Fiers v. Revel, came by way of a
priority determination in an appeal from an interference
90
proceeding. In Fiers, the respondent Revel tried to establish a
priority date for a human DNA claim by stating that the DNA
was part of the invention and providing a method by which it
91
The court rejected this argument and
could be isolated.
reasoned that a DNA claim must be limited to its precise
92
sequence, or “a description of the DNA itself.” The court then
elaborated that an adequate description required conception,
and that “a conception of a DNA requires a precise definition,
such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical
93
properties. . . .” The ruling suggested that a DNA claim could
be invalidated for failure to include its exact sequence, even if
the inventor otherwise properly enabled the invention by
teaching how to obtain the DNA.

85. 927 F.2d at 1203.
86. Id. at 1200. “Genus” claims are those directed towards a family of
items, rather than just a single family member, or “species.” See Hugh
McTavish, Note, Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA, MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV., Vol.2 No.1, 121, at 121-22.
87. See 927 F.2d at 1204. Claim 7 reads as follows:
A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA
sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence
sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow possession of
the biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase
production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to increase
hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.
Id.
88. See infra Part I.F.
89. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214 (“It is not sufficient, having made the
gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained,
to claim all possible genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity.”).
90. See 984 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
91. See id. at 1170.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1171.
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Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &
Company seemingly confirmed that the chemical structure
(sequence) of a DNA molecule is required to meet the written
94
In Eli Lilly, scientists at the
description requirement.
University of California cloned the cDNA for rat insulin; the
sequence of which was included in the specification of a
95
In addition, the specification also
subsequent patent.
included the amino acid sequence of the human insulin protein
and a method for cloning and obtaining the sequence of the
96
human insulin gene. It was further known that the amino
acid sequences of insulin proteins are well conserved among
diverse species and that non-human insulin was functional in
97
the treatment of human diabetes patients.
The patent at issue in Eli Lilly claimed not only the rat
98
insulin cDNA, but also the human insulin cDNA. In affirming
the invalidation of the human insulin cDNA claim, the Federal
Circuit reiterated the dual standards of the written description
99
requirement suggested in Fiers. According to the court, the
University of California had not proved that it possessed the
claimed invention nor had it adequately described the DNA
molecule itself by structure, formula, chemical name, or
100
The description of what a DNA or
physical properties.
protein does, in terms of function or result, was held
101
insufficient; the molecule itself must be described.
The Eli Lilly decision sparked a rigorous debate amongst
commentators, many of who were critical of the Federal
102
The heightened written
Circuit’s doctrinal expansion.

94. 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
95. See id. at 1562-63.
96. Id. at 1567.
97. See Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written
Description Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli
Lilly & Company, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1305-06 (1999).
98. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
99. Id. at 1568-69 (holding “[t]hus, as we have previously held, a cDNA is
not defined or described by the mere name ‘cDNA,’ even if accompanied by the
name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make
up the cDNA.”); see Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100. 119 F.3d at 1568.
101. Id. It is important to note that the claims at issue in Eli Lilly were
original claims; the court was not attempting to determine at what date the
disclosure supported added claims. Thus, the written description doctrine was
being applied as a substantive disclosure requirement. See id.
102. See e.g., Mueller, supra note 77, at 651-52 (arguing that inventors will
delay filing applications until the precise structure of the DNA components of
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description requirement for biotech inventions has been decried
as a “super-enablement” standard, largely because the amount
of detail required to satisfy the new written description
103
The written
requirement will almost certainly be enabling.
description requirement after Eli Lilly now potentially serves
the following purposes: (1) to demonstrate possession of a
claimed invention in priority disputes; (2) to convey all the
details of an invention to facilitate enablement; and (3) to be a
general measure of the adequacy of a disclosure independent of
enablement. In addition, an implied purpose of the written
description requirement is to allow for the examination of a
104
patent by the PTO.
In an effort to conform its examination procedures to
Federal Circuit precedent, the PTO issued “Written Description
105
Guidelines” (Guidelines) on January 5, 2001. The Guidelines
make a clear distinction between technologies that are new and
106
Separate
unpredictable and those that are established.
107
requirements are outlined for each.
For predictable
technologies, the written description requirement is satisfied by
the disclosure of the invention’s function and its method of
108
This is not so for younger, and hence
production.
109
unpredictable, fields; a higher level of disclosure is needed.
“[A] clear depiction of the invention in detailed drawings or in
structural chemical formulas” is also required for the
unpredictable arts—a level of precision that strongly implies
110
only a full structure will be satisfactory.
The Guidelines are heavily focused on the biotechnology
realm and provide many examples applicable to DNA and
111
The Guidelines state that disclosure of
protein inventions.
the amino acid sequence of a given protein satisfies the written

the invention are known, thus hindering public access to cutting-edge
technologies).
103. See id. at 633.
104. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1027 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
105. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35
U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5,
2001) [hereinafter “Guidelines”].
106. See id. at 1106.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1105.
111. See generally id.
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description requirement for all cDNAs encoding that protein.
The PTO also allows descriptions of DNAs and proteins based
on percentage of sequence identity with another known
113
114
Finally, for genus claims, a “representative
sequence.
number of species” must be adequately described in compliance
115
This can be
with the Guidelines’ other requirements.
achieved if the species described are indicative of the properties
116
claimed for the entire genus. This principle suggests that the
PTO is willing to consider claims to slight variants of disclosed
sequences that possess the same function.
F. THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT
The enablement doctrine ensures that an inventor’s claim
scope is commensurate with the actual invention that is
117
disclosed.
In order to enable properly, a patent must
adequately teach a skilled artisan how to fully make and use
118
Enablement is traditionally assessed in
the invention.
biotechnology cases by determining whether the invention may
119
The
be made and used without “undue experimentation.”
enablement standard has varied little over the last few
decades, and satisfaction of the enablement requirement is a
120
question of law.
121
In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit listed eight factors
for courts to consider when determining if a disclosed
122
The
invention’s use required “undue experimentation.”

112. See id. at 1111 n.57.
113. Cf. id. at 1104 (explaining that “possession may be shown . . . by
describing distinguishing identifying characteristics sufficient to show that the
applicant was in possession of the claimed invention”).
114. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
115. Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106.
116. Id. at 1106.
117. See McTavish, supra note 86, at 124-25.
118. See e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that “[t]o be enabling under § 112, a
patent must contain a description that enables one skilled in the art to make
and use the claimed invention”).
119. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (stating “[t]hat some experimentation is necessary does not constitute a
lack of enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must not be
unduly extensive”).
120. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (listing enablement cases).
121. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
122. See id. at 737.
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Wands factors are:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability
123
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.

Acknowledging that inventions in highly technical fields
may require substantial amounts of work to reproduce, the
Wands court clarified that the focus of the inquiry should be on
124
A patentee
what is “undue,” and not on “experimentation.”
need not provide detailed instructions on methods that are
125
The invention need not be
routine in the field.
126
understandable by the general public to be properly enabled.
Rather, a person having ordinary skill in the art (a
127
“PHOSITA” ) must be capable of making and using the
128
invention.
In the field of biotechnology, a PHOSITA is a
129
Ph.D.-level scientist.
II. CASE DESCRIPTION
A proper understanding of the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. requires that the facts of
the case be more thoroughly elaborated. Enzo’s patent claimed
DNA probes that specifically bound the genomic DNA from the
bacteria responsible for gonorrhea over that of the bacteria that
130
These two bacterial strains are between
causes meningitis.
131
eighty and ninety-three percent homologous.
The claims
were structured in terms of binding ratios between the two
strains when the probes were employed in a hybridization
132
Although the patent application did not include the
assay.
sequences of the DNA probes, three DNA sequences were
133
134
deposited with the ATCC, a public biological depository.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Calgene, 188 F.3d at 1373-74.
126. See id.
127. See generally, Joseph P. Meara, Comment, Just Who is the Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77
WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002) (discussing generally the judiciary’s use of the
PHOSITA standard).
128. See Calgene, 188 F.3d at 1373.
129. Id.
130. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2.
131. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1320.
132. See id. at 1321-22.
133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Claims were drawn to these three sequences, as well as
“discrete nucleotide subsequences thereof” and “mutated
discrete nucleotide sequences of any of the foregoing inserts
that are within said hybridization ratio and subsequences
135
Thus, the substance of the invention is any DNA
thereof.”
sequence that binds to the chromosomal DNA of the two
136
bacteria within a specified range.
In reaching its initial decision affirming the invalidity of
the patent, the Federal Circuit woodenly applied the “biotech”
137
The
written description doctrine synthesized in Eli Lilly.
court reiterated the rule that the “adequate written description
of genetic material ‘requires a precise definition, such as by
structure,
formula,
chemical
name,
or
physical
138
The court then found that the disclosure of
properties’. . . .”
the probe’s ability to bind specifically to one bacterial genome
was not a “chemical property” of the probe and was thus
139
These data were merely functional, and “[a]
inadequate.
description of what the genetic material does, rather than of
140
what it is, does not suffice.” The simple fact, that the precise
DNA sequences were not recited in the specification,
141
The
established a per se failure to satisfy the requirement.
court went on to hold that functional disclosure did not satisfy
the PTO Guidelines, and that these Guidelines were not
142
binding upon the court anyway. Finally, the court ruled that
while a deposit may satisfy the enablement requirement, it is
143
not an adequate substitute for a written description.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk disagreed with the
majority’s holding that the sequence of a DNA molecule was per
144
se required to meet the written description requirement.
He
pointed out that reaching such a conclusion as a matter of law
was inappropriate since “the written description requirement

134. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1326.
135. Id. at 1322.
136. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2.
137. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d 1013, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
138. Id. at 1018 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119
F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171
(Fed. Cir. 1993))).
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568).
141. See id. at 1021.
142. See id. at 1019.
143. See id. at 1021-22.
144. See id. at 1024-25.
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145

presents a factual issue.”
Accordingly, the correct inquiry
should be “whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
146
consider the specification to describe the claimed invention.”
Judge Dyk reasoned that if selective hybridization is
sufficiently indicative of a DNA structure in the view of experts
147
in the field, then the law should also be satisfied. The dissent
also concluded that public deposit of biological materials is an
ideal way to meet the written description’s primary purpose of
148
Judge Dyk also
public notice of the patent’s claim scope.
rejected the majority’s claim that a secondary purpose of the
written description requirement— allowing for efficient
149
He noted that the
examination by the PTO— was not met.
examiner had not rejected the claims for failure to comply with
the written description requirement, and that the PTO
encourages applicants to use depositories to satisfy §112,
150
In conclusion, the dissent
paragraph 1 requirements.
reflected that the policy endorsed by the majority was unfair to
the applicant who, finding no statutory or PTO bar, relies on a
151
public deposit.
On petition for rehearing, the Federal Circuit abruptly
vacated its earlier decision and summarily reversed the
152
The court held that
insufficiency of deposited material.
“reference in the specification to deposits of nucleotide
sequences describes those sequences sufficiently to the public
153
for purposes of meeting the written description requirement.”
The claims directed to the deposited sequences themselves,
including the bacterial genomes used in the hybridization
154
protocol, were thus held to be adequately described. Whether
this was also true for the generic claims to subsequences and
mutations of the deposited sequences was a question of fact

145. Id. at 1024.
146. Id. at 1026.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1027.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1027-28.
151. See id. at 1029.
152. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
153. Id. at 1326. The court added “we hold that reference in the
specification to a deposit in a public depository, which makes its contents
accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form,
constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to
comply with the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.” Id. at 1325
(emphasis added).
154. See id. at 1326, 1328.
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that could be answered only on remand.
The district court
was instructed to “determine whether a person of skill in the
art would glean from the written description, including
information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed
sequences, subsequences, mutated variants, and mixtures
sufficient to demonstrate possession of the generic scope of the
156
claims.”
The Federal Circuit also conceded that not “all functional
descriptions of genetic material fail to meet the written
157
The court then adopted the PTO
description requirement.”
Guidelines’ standard that the written description may be met
by disclosure of “functional characteristics when coupled with a
known or disclosed correlation between function and
158
The court held that ability of a DNA probe to
structure.”
selectively bind another DNA sequence may be sufficiently
indicative of the probe’s structure to satisfy the written
159
The decision raised the possibility
description requirement.
that the hybridization function of DNA probes, by itself, might
not adequately describe probes generated from the deposited
160
The rationale was that the specification did not
sequences.
include the specific location on the bacterial DNA where the
161
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
probes bound.
162
determination was a question of fact. If one of skill in the art
would find the “disclosure of the hybridization function and an
accessible structure” satisfactory, then the court would as
163
well.
164
Because an en banc hearing is required to do so, the
165
Federal Circuit did not expressly overrule Eli Lilly.
The
implicit per se rule against functional descriptions was
dispelled; the court subtly altered its interpretation of Eli Lilly,

155. See id. at 1326-27.
156. Id. at 1327.
157. Id. at 1324.
158. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106).
159. See id. at 1324-25.
160. See id. at 1328.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See Campa v. United States, 300 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting “[a]s with all parties seeking to overturn the precedent of our court,
Plaintiffs would likely need to seek en banc consideration of this issue”) (citing
FED. CIR. R. 35(a) (“[o]nly the court en banc may overrule a binding
precedent”)).
165. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1330.
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stating, “[a] description of what a material does, rather than of
166
what it is, usually does not suffice.”
Further, the court
maintained that the written description requirement is not
167
necessarily met solely by possession of the invention.
Possession is thus but one inquiry, and will fail to satisfy the
written description requirement if “the specification does not
168
adequately describe the claimed invention.” Compliance thus
requires both the deposit itself and the recitation of the
169
accession number of the deposit in the specification.
III.ANALYSIS
A. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT AFTER ENZO II
After Eli Lilly, inventors were certain of one thing: the
written description requirement for a DNA molecule was
170
Enzo II
satisfied by the recitation of its exact sequence.
purports to provide additional means by which inventors might
171
also meet this goal. Although this appears to be a concession
to biologists, a significant gap is left between what might
satisfy the requirement and what actually does provide an
adequate written description.
Exactly what disclosure will now satisfy the written
description requirement is unclear. On top of that, it appears
as if a significant division exists amongst the Federal Circuit
172
Judges themselves regarding the contours of the doctrine.
Patent prosecutors are thus left in the uncomfortable position
of having to craft applications that meet the PTO’s conception
of written description, yet may not withstand future scrutiny in
the courts. Despite the Federal Circuit’s apparent doctrinal
softening in the rehearing of Enzo, it is important to realize
that much of the doctrine created in Eli Lilly remains good
173
law. This section attempts to explain the current contours of

166. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
167. See id.
168. Id. at 1330.
169. See id.
170. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 152-163 and accompanying text.
172. See generally, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, 42 Fed. Appx. 439
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (laying out the Federal Circuit judges’ arguments for and
against rehearing the case en banc).
173. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
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the written description requirement.
1. Possession
The Enzo II decision upholds the conventional doctrine
that the primary purpose of the written description
requirement is to demonstrate possession of the claimed
174
invention.
As held in Eli Lilly, this extends beyond
determining if a patent’s specification can adequately support
amended claims; possession must also be demonstrated for
175
original claims. Making a biological deposit may now be used
to demonstrate possession, but this is contingent on the
accession number of the deposit being recited in the
176
Although functional data indicative of a
specification.
particular structure may now be used to demonstrate
possession, the focus of the inquiry remains the physical
177
possession of a DNA molecule itself.
Merely showing physical possession of a DNA molecule,
178
however, will not satisfy the written description requirement.
Enzo certainly possessed the claimed subsequences, as they are
179
Under the Enzo II
inherently parts of the deposited probes.
holding, something more is required: an inventor must also be
180
able to sufficiently communicate possession to others.
However, meeting this burden is where the controversy begins.
2. Substantive Description
In addition to proof of possession, the Enzo II court
requires that the specification provide a substantive description
of the invention so that one skilled in the art would recognize
181
This requirement is wholly
its structure and limitations.
separate from possession, and is likewise unique to
biotechnology inventions. A DNA must be described in such
terms that one can develop a mental picture of the molecule.
The critical question in this inquiry is not “do I think you have
the invention?” Rather, it is “have you adequately captured the
invention in words?” In accord with Eli Lilly, this inquiry

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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comprises a substantive disclosure requirement for purposes of
182
patentability.
Although a biological deposit may also
adequately describe an invention to satisfy this disclosure
requirement, there are several caveats.
For example, a
biological deposit alone may not be sufficient if the court
believes that the invention could have been captured solely
183
with words or sequences.
Therefore, in the case of a single DNA molecule, recitation
of the precise DNA sequence or reference to a deposit in an
accessible biological repository will satisfy the written
184
description requirement. The unsettled issue is what level of
disclosure will meet the written description requirement for
claims to sequences derived from the deposited probes.
185
Notwithstanding the use of functional descriptions, it is
difficult to imagine how claims to subsequences such as Enzo’s
can meet this standard without placing a near impossible
burden on the applicant. The specification would need to
contain either a systematic listing of every potential DNA
subsequence, or a deposit of each and every claimed sequence
would need to be made. Neither of these options is practical
when more than a handful of sequences are claimed.
The scope of exactly what must be adequately described is
also an open issue. Will it be fatal if an inventor fails to
adequately describe a process or entity that he wrongly believes
is common in the art? The inventor must also consider that
future experts looking back to the technology present on the
filing date will judge the descriptions. Thus, it might be wise to
discuss relatively new techniques in great detail to compensate
for the margin of error inherent in hindsight analyses. It also
appears that in addition to the quality of the information
contained within a figure, an inventor will be judged on the
ability of the figure to communicate the importance of the data.
The inventor not only must generate sufficient data to support
the invention, but must also present the data in such a manner
that the reader will understand how it relates to the claims of
the invention.
3. The Adequacy of Functional Data
Enzo II marks the first time the Federal Circuit has

182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.3.
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allowed functional rather than purely structural data to be
considered towards fulfilling the possession and substantive
186
description requirements discussed above.
Importantly,
functional descriptions must still focus on what the inventor
187
Although the court
possesses, not what she has enabled.
opened the door to the use of functional data to meet the
written description requirement, the court failed to provide
guidance on exactly what will be viewed as adequate.
In fact, the court suggested that hybridization data would
only be sufficient if the complementary sequence bound by the
188
This suggestion is, at best, a mixed
probe is disclosed.
blessing for inventors. On the one hand, it opens up the
possibility that one may claim all DNA probes that bind to a
precisely defined DNA sequence, without the need to specify all
the possible sequences of the probes. On the other hand, this
claim still requires that the sequence of the target DNA be
disclosed, which might be just as limiting as requiring the
sequence of the probe in the first place.
189
the PTO
Because of their adoption by the court,
Guidelines provide a least one embodiment of the new standard
190
The Guidelines state that
for acceptable functional data.
functional definitions are allowable when “coupled with a
known or disclosed correlation between function and
191
While this standard sounds good in principle, its
structure.”
practical application is uncertain. The statement articulates
that functional data is acceptable in certain circumstances, yet
fails to define those scenarios. How strong must the correlation
be? Must the functional data be indicative of the precise DNA
structure at the nucleotide level? The language suggests that
only functional data directly dependent on a known DNA
sequence is acceptable, a concession akin to allowing a
photocopy of a document to replace the original.
The
requirement thus remains dependent on the actual structure of
the DNA molecule, with allowances made for the manner in
which the sequence can be illustrated.
A reasonable reading of the decision might lead one to
speculate that data indicative of DNA structure may suffice,

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-116 and accompanying text.
Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106.
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but that this extension is probably limited to data from which
the sequence can be deduced with near-absolute precision. In
other words, alternate ways of describing the sequence,
provided one knows the exact sequence, may be an adequate
proxy for the true sequence. Examples might include a
restriction map coupled with the number of nucleotides, or the
sequence of a DNA probe with which the claimed DNA
192
For example, if the scientific community knows
hybridizes.
that a particular protein can bind only to a precise DNA
sequence, then an inventor may include the ability of a DNA to
bind the protein to satisfy, at least partially, the written
description requirement.
As in Enzo II, providing sufficient written description to
193
support a claim to a genus of DNAs is a concern for inventors.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Federal Circuit adopted the
194
complete PTO Guidelines for meeting the written description
rather than restricting it to the facts of the case, additional
195
data may constitute sufficient disclosure for genus claims. Of
particular interest is the PTO Guidelines’ suggestion that the
disclosure of a protein sequence may adequately support all
196
It remains unclear,
possible DNAs that encode the protein.
however, if the Federal Circuit has adopted the full extent of
the PTO Guidelines.
B. PRUNING BACK THE HEIGHTENED WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
In the inherently unpredictable biotechnology field,
primary issue remains; what is the proper standard
197
defining the scope of biological inventions.
In Enzo II,
Federal Circuit continues to place too much emphasis on

the
for
the
the


192. See Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of California v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 555 (1999).
193. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
194. This is merely a supposition at this point, as the court was ambiguous
in its holding. In reference to the description of DNA probes by preferential
binding, the court stated, “[w]e are persuaded by the Guidelines on this point
and adopt the PTO’s applicable standard for determining compliance with the
written description requirement.” Enzo II, 296 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (emphasis added).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 111-116.
196. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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primary structure of a DNA.
Despite making allowances for
the use of functional data, the focus on adequate
communication of possession rather than on what the
disclosure teaches the public is the real problem. Removing the
heightened written description requirement for biotechnology
will bring the patent laws in accord with basic biological
principles while providing clarity and certainty by employing
199
the well-established enablement standard.
By simply remanding the case to determine if the genus of
200
subsequences was “possessed” by Enzo, the court missed an
opportunity to clarify the law. The court should have agreed to
an en banc rehearing of the Enzo I decision and overruled the
heightened written description requirement created by Eli
201
Lilly.
In addition, the court should have held that, when
applied to original claims, the written description requirement
is satisfied if it coveys enough information to enable a
PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention. In other
words, the enablement doctrine should be the sole standard for
judging the adequacy of a patent’s disclosure. The written
description requirement should only maintain a distinct role in
determining priority dates for amended claims, consistent with
202
the holding in Vas-Cath.
1. Biotechnology Realities
By focusing the district court on the adequacy of the
disclosure’s descriptive qualities, rather than upon what the
disclosure enabled a PHOSITA to accomplish, the Enzo II court
203
fashioned a law in conflict with basic principles of biology.
The patented invention at issue in the Enzo decisions is more
than just a particular piece of DNA for which every
embodiment may be easily described and physically possessed.
The value of the invention is the identification of unique areas
204
of a bacterial genome that can be used as probes. The Enzo II
court ignored the heart of the invention by focusing on
205
technical possession and description, neither of which is an

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 168.
See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
See supra text accompanying notes 167-169.
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accurate measure of the invention’s scope.
Further, if its claims are denied on remand, Enzo will be in
the paradoxical situation of having enabled the use of
subsequences derived from its probes, yet will not be entitled to
claims covering the subsequences. A scientist needs no special
skills to select and make use of a smaller nucleotide
206
subsequence within those disclosed by Enzo. Thus, the Enzo
II court’s rule can frequently reward the ordinary technician
who learns from and exploits aspects of a patentee’s
unprotected invention.
Focusing solely on the chemical structure of a protein or
DNA molecule belies its true nature. A DNA molecule is often
useful not merely due to its nucleotide sequence, but also
207
Under
because of its ability to encode a particular protein.
the holding of Enzo II, a scientist seeking to patent a DNA
sequence that encodes a particular protein would need to
disclose every other degenerate DNA capable of encoding the
same protein. If she failed to do so, synthesizing a distinct
DNA that encodes the exact same protein could easily
208
circumvent her patent.
If an inventor provides sufficient instructions so that the
public can readily make and use a genus of DNAs, she should
be entitled to claim this genus. In Enzo II, the acceptability of
claims to subsequences of the deposited sequences should have
been judged by whether the disclosure was enabling. This
stipulation, combined with the other substantive patenting
requirements (e.g., novelty), accurately contains the scope of
209
the invention to that which has been taught to the public. It
makes little sense to deny protection simply because the precise
DNA sequences have not been laboriously recited on paper.
Enablement provides a fair measure of claim scope; there is no
210
If
need for an arbitrary and inflexible second standard.
Enzo’s disclosure does not teach the ordinary scientist how fully
to make and use the inventions, the claims are properly
211
rejected as involving undue experimentation.

206. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
210. See Robert A. Hodges, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a “Mere
Wish or Plan” Should Be Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention,
17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 831, 857-858 (2001).
211. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.
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A rigorous structural focus ignores the truly innovative
elements of a DNA invention and effectively treats each
individual nucleotide as a separate claim element. While a
fixed structural requirement freezes the technology at a level
already exceeded by today’s methods, the enablement standard
allows the adequacy of the disclosure to evolve with the effort
required to carry out the described process. Cloning genes from
amino acid sequences, even partial sequences, is increasingly
212
routine. Determining the function of a protein or DNA is the
213
truly innovative work.
The current written description
requirement rewards those who master basic technical
procedures, rather than those who extend the boundaries of
biology.
2. Benefits of the Enablement Standard
The inadequate patent protection currently afforded DNA
inventions discourages the public disclosure of new discoveries.
For example, consider the options of a company like Enzo
making the same discovery while cognizant of the heightened
written description requirement at the time of invention. Even
though the claims to the deposited sequences were allowed, the
invention is worthless without inclusion of the claims to
214
subsequences and subtle mutations. A competitor needs only
to obtain the sequence of the unique DNAs from the patent
specification or depository and select a smaller probe from
within the disclosed sequence that functions equivalently.
Faced with this degree of protection from a patent, Enzo will be
better served by keeping the knowledge as a trade secret or
attempting to develop a method to conceal the sequence of the
probe from the end user. Neither of these options will result in
a meaningful public disclosure that fulfills the constitutional
215
mandate to further the sciences.
Use of the enablement standard as the sole measure of
disclosure, in contrast, provides claim coverage commensurate
216
This result
with what has been added to the public domain.

212. See, e.g., Yuji Yamanashi & David Baltimore, Identification of the Abland rasGAP-Associated 62 kDa Protein as a Docking Protein, Dok, 88 CELL
205, 209 (1997) (detailing a procedure for the cloning of a mammalian gene
from peptide sequences derived from an isolated protein).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 135-136
215. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.
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is fair to inventors and not only provides incentive for
innovation, but also encourages the disclosure of new
discoveries so that the public may benefit from and build upon
them.
The enablement standard would also promote greater
harmony between the PTO and the Federal Circuit. Under the
current system, the Federal Circuit promulgates rules on what
constitutes an adequate written description and the PTO
attempts to faithfully translate these rules into workable
217
protocols for examiners. Use of only the enablement doctrine
obviates the need for this constant updating process as the
standard is flexible and evolves with the very technology being
assessed. The PTO and the courts would be making the same
judgment and applying the same standard: whether the
disclosure is sufficient to enable one to make and use the
invention. Though each institution’s interpretation of what
disclosure is enabling may deviate slightly over time, the
Federal Circuit can still make subtle corrections to PTO
procedure through its decisions. Because the enablement
standard varies with the technological capabilities at the time
in question, the awkward task of shoehorning state of the art
inventions into judicial categories based on decades-old
conceptions will be avoided. The Federal Circuit’s subsequent
rulings are thus less likely to be antipodal to PTO decisions,
and patents granted by the PTO are less likely to be later held
invalid for failure to comply with unforeseen disclosure
requirements.
Finally, the enablement standard is based on well-settled
case law, which provides the clarity and certainty required by
218
Because
the patent-dependent biotechnology industry.
compliance with the enablement requirement is a question of
law, trial outcomes are likely to be more predictable than jury219
In the end, even if the
decided written description issues.
Federal Circuit had invalidated Enzo’s claims for lack of
enablement, Enzo might well have foreseen this problem
through its own analysis of the adequacy of the patent’s
disclosure. However, because Enzo’s patent was issued almost

217. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
218. See Sasha Blaug, et al., Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe: Complying with
the Written Description Requirement under US Patent Law, 21 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 97, 98 (2003).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 117-120.
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eight years prior to the Eli Lilly decision, the company was
powerless to either predict or prevent potentially invalidating
deficiencies arising from the new written description doctrine.
Unless the heightened written description requirement is
shelved in the near future, one can only speculate how many
other patentees will fall into this trap.
IV.CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has long struggled with the application
of the written description requirement to biotechnology
inventions, and considerable confusion surrounds exactly what
it takes to satisfy the requirement. The court missed the
opportunity to clarify the doctrine in the rehearing of Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. The court correctly held that a
biological deposit and a reference to the accession number of
the deposit in the specification can be used to demonstrate
possession of an invention. At the same time, however, the
court maintained the previously held view that possession
alone will not meet the written description requirement. The
larger question of which functional descriptions are adequate
remains unanswered.
The Federal Circuit should take the next available
opportunity to overrule the Eli Lilly decision through an en
banc hearing and return enablement as the sole substantive
disclosure requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1. The
heightened written description standard applied to
biotechnology inventions after Eli Lilly ignores fundamental
biological principles and focuses too much attention on the
structure of a DNA or protein. In addition, the standard is
inflexible to technological changes and requires constant
updating that leads to uncertainty over patent validity.
Finally, the heightened requirement fails to meet the
constitutional purpose behind the patent laws by discouraging
full disclosure of biological inventions. Simply returning to the
enablement disclosure standard that was in effect prior to Eli
Lilly would solve the bulk of these problems.


220. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2.

